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UGANDA'S POLITICAL PARTIES

UGANDA politics have for some years bewildered not only those with a superficial knowledge of African affairs but also the experts. The latest turn of the kaleidoscope has produced two new political movements, the Uganda Peoples Union (U.P.U.) and the Uganda National Movement (U.N.M.), and at least one political leader (Augustine Kamywa) previously unknown. At the end of 1958 direct elections were held for the first time for 18 seats. Four main parties contested, the Uganda Congress (U.C.), the breakaway United Congress Party (U.C.P.), the Progressive Party (P.P.), and the Democratic Party (D.P.). There were a number of independents. The results, with a poll of over 530,000, were U.C. five, P.P. none, U.C.P. none, D.P. one, independents four. Three independents were indirectly elected or appointed from Bugisu, Ankole and Karamoja and the five Buganda seats were vacant. Now only three months after the leaders of the first three parties have formed the new 'National Movement'; the Congress, under a new leader, has reunited with the U.C.P., two of the successful Congress candidates have joined the independents to form the U.P.U. Behind the facile explanation of 'rival political personalities' there lies a real clash of African interests. With the removal of the imperial bogey what is to be the focus of loyalty in the new nation? If the slogan is 'Independence Now', who is to rule Uganda tomorrow?

The Uganda political scene is haunted by three ghosts: the ancient rivalry of Buganda and the western Uganda Kingdoms, the muted competition between Catholic African and Anglican African and the predominance of Buganda in Uganda's history. The Uganda Congress in the face of a reforming and not unpopular colonial Government has for the most part provided little more than a rallying point for local anti-administration grievances. For the past six years it has been an

all-Uganda party under the leadership of Musazi, a genial Ganda with a talent for oratory but little for organisation or strategy. It was dissatisfaction with his leadership which caused the U.C.P. to split away. When the Kabaka was deported in 1953 it seemed that the Congress might become the monolithic party one expects in a country moving towards independence. The measure of its success is shown by its emergence as the largest single party in the Uganda Legislative Council; its failure by the revolts in the party committee and the replacement immediately after the elections of Musazi by the non-Ganda Obote.

The Congress revolts may well have owed something to the example of Ghana and to Nkrumah's successful breakaway from the old Gold Coast Convention. Ironically, however, the real beneficiaries of the deportation were not Congress but the traditionalists in Buganda and the 'Neo-Traditional' political group which since 1955 has ruled Buganda in the name of the Kabakaship. The most important lesson Ghana has taught has been to the present leaders of the Lukiko who have watched with extreme concern the attacks of the Convention Peoples Party on the traditional Ashanti chiefdoms. Kintu, the chief minister, and the Lukiko, elected in 1955 on a wave of enthusiasm for the Kabaka's return, have as a result consistently followed a policy of 'little nationalism' based largely on past tradition. They have campaigned against both the Uganda Legislative Council¹ and the local political parties. Among the leaders of the Neo-Traditionalists are the Saza

¹ The appeal of the Buganda Katikiro (Chief Minister) has been dismissed by the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa (*The Times*, 11th May, 1959). Mr. M. Kintu claimed that under the 1955 agreement with Britain he was no longer required to arrange the election of Buganda representatives to Legislative Council because of the appointment of a Speaker to preside in place of the Governor.

Chief Lutaya and the Lukiko Minister, Sempa. Its strength and its weakness is that it is a *Buganda*, and not an *all-Uganda*, movement.

The two other parties which contested the elections were both concrete expressions of the lack of confidence in Musazi. The Progressive Party, led by Mulira, was largely supported by Anglicans and by the more educated classes. The Democratic Party was accused by some of being a Catholic group but now includes at least one Anglican officer, and has considerable backing amongst less educated classes. Other parties, such as the 'Labour Party,' are little more than names. Of the four major parties in 1958 all were Ganda-led but all claimed Uganda-wide membership.

Of the post-election developments two facts are significant. First, both the reconstituted Congress Party and the new Uganda Peoples Union are led by non-Ganda politicians. The U.P.U., a grouping of seven African representative members, is inevitably non-Buganda in view of the refusal of the Lukiko to put forward any Buganda representatives to LegCo. Its leaders include Nadioppe (a Busoga chief, and ex-Congress), Rwetsiba (a Science graduate from Ankole), and Magezi (from Buganda's rival Bunyoro, ex-Congress). Secondly, both the U.P.U. and the Uganda National Movement avoid the use of the term 'Party'. The U.N.M. launched by Mulira, Musazi and Binaisa (formerly leaders of the P.P., U.C. and U.C.P. respectively) seem to have chosen a non-party figure, Kamyia, as leader. It has so far been favoured by the 'Neo-Traditionalists'. Why do three politicians with an all-Uganda outlook initiate such a movement? The reason may be that they are attempting to salvage a situation in which Buganda politics are in danger of drifting away from non-Ganda politics—by making a new bid for a monolithic nationalist movement. Another clue might lie in the Nkrumah stress on an 'African personality,' and the local talk, following the Accra Conference, about an 'African interpretation' of democracy and the necessity for amalgamation of Uganda's parties. For good measure the U.N.M. are urging a boycott against non-African commerce and bus transport, mainly Indian. One is further aware that what might possibly be the most powerful of the Uganda political groupings, the Buganda 'Neo-Traditionalists,' calls itself neither party, nor union, nor movement. With the U.N.M. leader all Baganda, and the U.P.U. leadership all non-Ganda, the lines of political division in Uganda today look all too ominously obvious—whatever may be the ultimate intentions of the leaders. Are these, one wonders, the real dividing interests in Uganda today?

W. J. A. HARRIS

Comment

KENYA'S FUTURE

MR. LENNOX-BOYD'S statement on Kenya deserved very much more publicity than it got. In it he stated that he intended 'if conditions were suitable' to call a constitutional conference with expert advice before the 1960 general elections and that Kenya was to go forward 'within the broad framework of democratic government.' Later he went further and said that there would be no limitation on the agenda of this conference. This is the first time that he has officially used the word democracy in connection with Kenya's future and it is a complete and most welcome reversal of his November despatch.

It seems likely that the opposing factions at this conference will be the two newly formed alliances, the Constituency Elected Members Organisation and the New Kenya Group. What chance is there of agreement?

A delegation from CEMO came to London last month. They welcomed the statement and agreed to call off the boycott of the Legislative Council which Indian and African elected members have carried on since last December. In their talks with the Colonial Secretary they concentrated on pressing for the end of the emergency and for greater freedom to organise. They have as yet issued no detailed constitutional proposals, but their chief demands are likely to be for universal suffrage in the African communal seats and for the introduction (perhaps on the Tanganyika model) of common roll seats in the urban areas. They admit the necessity for a government majority at present but demand full self-government within ten years.

Mr. Michael Blundell, the leader of the New Kenya Group, has also been in London. He refused to expand his statement of policy or to reveal what practical steps his group plans to take. He did however say that he hoped it would be possible to introduce African tenant farmers into the White Highlands within a year. His constitutional proposal is that the Specially Elected members should be elected not from within the Legislative Council but by electoral colleges in the different regions.

Both groups asked the Secretary of State to appoint a commission of constitutional experts to go to Kenya before the conference to study conditions.

Much of the success of the conference will depend upon how these two groups strengthen their organisation and implement their policies in the next six months. One of the biggest imponderables is the allegiance of Mr. Vasey, the

present Minister of Finance. There are rumours that he intends, when his tour ends in September, to start his own political party. This would be a great mistake. Mr. Vasey is one of the few Europeans whom the African nationalists trust and who could be elected on an African vote. Were he to give his support to CEMO, and his views are not so very different, he could do much to give this group a genuinely non-racial outlook. In this respect CEMO would do well to sponsor an organisation outside the Legislative Council which would be open, as their group with the Legislative Council is open, to Europeans and Indians who agreed with the African view.

Tension is easing in Kenya but social and economic pressure is still great. The best way in which the Kenya government could prepare for the conference would be to use its political power to tackle some of the outstanding social and economic problems. Radical measures are needed to deal with the over-crowding in the African reserves, the housing position in both the African and Indian quarters, the disproportionate allocation of education expenditure. Action on these questions and a relaxation of emergency legislation would make compromise at the conference much more possible.

HOLA

ON 24th February the Labour Party moved the adjournment on the conditions in the Kenya prisons and detention camps and called for an independent enquiry. This followed a series of Parliamentary questions over a long period on cases of brutality. The Government refused to call an enquiry and Mr. Amery said: 'The system is sound . . . an enquiry could only shake public confidence in the Government of Kenya.'

Now, as a result of the death through violence of 11 prisoners at the Hola detention camp, the Government has been forced to hold an enquiry. Even this will only have authority to advise on the future of the detention camps. Do eleven men have to die before the Government moves even this far?

The deaths at Hola are a most serious affair. Not only were the detainees beaten up in accordance with the 'Cowan Plan' which had government approval, but an attempt was made at the highest level to cover up the whole incident. Yet the coroner found himself unable to attribute blame to particular people in respect of identified illegal force and the Attorney General has agreed with him. The only move so far is the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Camp Commandant, Mr. Sullivan, and his deputy Mr. Coutts, and compensation for the relatives of the detainees.

Nothing can eradicate this tragedy and far-

reaching action is needed if we are to salvage our good name. The coroner's report made it clear that this was not a case where subordinates were irresponsible, but that the whole policy was at fault. It is vital that the Government appoint an experienced commission with power to enquire into the whole administration of justice in Kenya. Only in this way can public confidence be restored. In the light of the easing political tension this is doubly necessary.

THE GOVERNOR AND ZAMBIA

AFRICAN organisations in Northern Rhodesia have been more fortunate than those in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Zambia African National Congress has been banned and its leaders rusticated, without trial, but they have escaped indefinite detention in Southern Rhodesian jails. The Northern Rhodesian African National Congress decided to take part in the recent elections, and the President, Mr. Harry Nkumbula, won a seat. So far the Congress has not been restricted. It is now carrying on a campaign against racial discrimination and is challenging segregation in churches and hospitals.

The Governor has appointed Mr. Ridley, a civil servant with some legal qualifications, to enquire into the circumstances that led to the introduction of the Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulations, 1959, in fact to report on the situation which necessitated action against Zambia Congress.

The Governor accuses Mr. Kaunda, the president of Zambia, of 'conspiracy to use force and restraint' against voters and candidates in the legislative council elections of March 20th; of 'conspiracy to cause damage to property and injury to persons'; of 'conspiracy to hold unlawful meetings' and of 'counselling others so to do'.

The Governor has supported his action by stating¹ that the Accra conference changed the Zambia policy from one of non-violence to violence. Mr. Kaunda maintains in his prepared statement that there was no change of policy and that the Governor is incorrect in saying that Mr. Nkumbula disagreed with Accra policy and left before the Conference ended. He denies that Zambia has used intimidation in the four short months of its existence. He reaffirms the determination of Zambia to oppose a constitution which divides the people of the territory into 'Ordinary, Special and Ungraded Human Beings' in the interests of the Europeans. He maintains the right of majority rule in Africa but not the exclusion of other races. He condemns racial

¹ *Central African Post*, March 13th, 1959.

discrimination whether imposed by African or Europeans. Mr. Kaunda insists that the Government knew that Zambia would negotiate with the appropriate authority on any contentious issue and, failing to reach agreement, would warn the authority three times before taking action. He refutes the Governor's accusation that there was any concerted action on the part of the African National Congresses of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to use violence.

With the conflicting evidence before us, we must press for a commission of enquiry, independent of the Northern Rhodesian Government and further for the Zambia leaders to be brought to trial or released. A British Parliamentary delegation is urgently necessary after the reports of the Commissions in the two Northern territories.

THE CLOVE ISLANDS

ZANZIBAR and her sister island of Pemba have a population of about 280,000, of whom a little over 200,000 are Africans, and roughly 40,000 Arab. In the past the Arabs have governed the island and today form the greater part of the administration, except for a top layer of British Civil Servants, under the Resident, Sir Henry Potter. However, in 1957 the Afro-Shirazi party won all the elected seats in the Legislative Council, and its leader, Abeid Karume, beat the Zanzibar Nationalist party leader, Sheik Ali Muhsin Barwani, in a straight fight. There is no doubt that in future elections the big battalions of the African peoples will win the vast majority of seats. The Arabs, along with the Indians, own most of the clove and coconut plantations, while the African masses (many of whom come from the mainland of Tanganyika) are landless labourers and low-paid workers. In the event of early independence, this could lead to a difficult situation, whereby an African elected government would have a civil service essentially Arab, and containing many members of the Nationalist party, who look to Cairo for political guidance. There is imperative need for African education, academic, technical and adult, to speed up the Africanisation of the administration.

The African population is at a disadvantage compared to the two older communities, Arab and Indian, who are wealthier and can afford to pay school fees. There is a case here for allocating the African boys and girls a specific number of places in the secondary schools, to make sure that they get a fair deal.

The Resident has just issued a White Paper increasing the number of elected members to eight, and decreasing the number of nominated members to four; but unfortunately the two unofficial

ministers in Executive Council are to be chosen by the Resident from nominated members and not from the elected members of the party which has won the elections. This obviously has met with the disapproval of the Afro-Shirazi Party who hold all the elected seats. The franchise has been widened by lowering the age qualification from 25 to 21, but women are still not allowed the vote. The government has announced an enquiry. The Afro-Shirazis feel keenly about the vote only being given to Zanzibaris born on the island. It should be extended to Africans from the mainland who have worked for, say, five years on the island.

There is great anxiety about the economic future of the island, since the clove industry, which accounts for over 80 per cent. of the income of the state, is facing severe competition from Madagascar, and there is a falling off of demand in the important Indonesian markets. Today the wealth of Zanzibar is literally stored in one large warehouse, where the Clove Growers Association have a stock of 15,000 tons of cloves, equivalent in value to £5m. sterling. They have never previously carried more than 8,000 tons, and now have an overdraft. With coconuts, counting for another 10 per cent. of the income, there is little left but chillies, limes and some fishing. The economy is not viable, and the island will need financial assistance from Her Majesty's Government for some years to come. It is unlikely that it can stand upon its own feet, and some form of association with Tanganyika would seem to be advisable. Yet today the Nationalist Party plaster the walls of public buildings with the slogan 'Uhuru 1960' and their leader, Ali Muhsin Barwani has tabled a motion in Legislative Council asking for discussions on 'Independence 1960'. This is opposed by the Afro-Shirazi Party who think 1960 premature.

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17,000 members. In September, 1958, it had 477 branches and 170,000 members and was stronger in the rural areas. Written support came to us from many who could not join. An Indian friend wrote after Congress was banned: 'this action is regarded by all non-Europeans as a deliberate attempt by the white settler government to suppress the political organisation which was their only hope.' If Sir Roy Welensky thinks we represent no one but ourselves, I challenge him to hold a plebiscite and find out. Sir Edgar Whitehead said we used intimidation. I know of no intimidation except in the other direction, except when the government tried to force chiefs to discredit Congress.

I speak of Congress in the present tense because Congress can be banned, but the feeling of the people which is what Congress is, can never be banned and because I myself am here in London to continue to put across our views.

WHY CONGRESS WAS BANNED

By JOSHUA MQABUKO-NKOMO

President-General, Southern Rhodesian African National Congress

IF Congress in Southern Rhodesia has the complete support of the African people, it is not surprising. We have had no other means of expressing ourselves. Let me recount some history. In 1923 a referendum was conducted among the voters—all Europeans—to decide whether the colony was to be the fifth province of South Africa or whether it was to have self-government. African people were not consulted. In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act was passed. This divided the country into European and African areas. Approximately 2½m. Africans, most of them farmers, had to be content with 33 per cent. of the land, while 200,000 Europeans, most of them urban dwellers, were allocated 50 per cent. All railways and main roads were in the European areas. Again no Africans were consulted. Franchise laws and the Industrial Conciliation Act which forbade Africans to organise or belong to Trade Unions were passed without our consent.

In the country the African cannot make a living because the land set aside will not support his family. He is forced to the town where he is unable to bargain about wages or conditions. He can be sacked, ejected or removed without appeal. He cannot bring pressure to bear on the government because without property, income and education he cannot vote.

All these grievances were centred in Congress. From 1939 to 1956 Congress confined itself to mediating between the Government and the people, and to making African grievances known. But in 1957 it was reconstituted and invigorated with a new and constructive policy and its own scheme for the future of the country. In the statement of policy these were the main points:

That Southern Rhodesia should have a National Unity, a real partnership, regardless of colour, race or creed, with equal opportunity in every sphere.

That Government should take immediate action to lessen the gap between the under- and the over-privileged.

That universal franchise is the only basis for a fair choice of government.

That the Land Apportionment Act be repealed so that the land is opened to all inhabitants of the country, while the reserves be retained for communal occupation by those Africans who because of their low standard of living could not compete in a free market.

Apart from its aims and objectives the constitution of Congress provided a full measure of democracy by giving supreme power to the Annual Conference, which was attended by delegates chosen at provincial conferences. For this purpose Southern Rhodesia was divided into four provinces, each of which held at least one conference a year, presided over by a provincial president. Branches in each

province sent representatives to the conferences and from these delegates to the Annual Conference were chosen.

The Annual Conference elected a National Executive, whose duty it was to run the affairs of Congress. The Annual Conference was presided over by the President General, who also presided at the meetings of the National Executive. The Branches ran their own local affairs through branch committees elected by themselves. Audited statements of accounts were tabled at the Annual Conference and the Provincial Annual Conference. The National Executive held office for three years, and the provincial and branch committees for one year only.

Congress welcomed people of any race who agreed with its aims and conditions of membership. A handful of Europeans and Indians joined. We determined to carry out our policy within the law, and our emphasis was on non-violence.

The Real Reason

Congress activity in the last two years has been mainly concerned with land. In 1954 the Land Husbandry Act was passed. Prior to that the land was communally owned and Africans grazed their cattle and farmed with the permission of the chief. This Act gave the government power to distribute plots of land and to regulate the way these plots were farmed. The Act stated that land would be given to anyone already farming and that Africans were to apply for permit. In fact no Africans applied and the Native Commissioners compelled them to take the permits. These did not give freehold titles and could be revoked at will. There was too little land to go round and many were made landless.

Congress complained many times that these laws were unfair and discriminatory. If the native reserves were over-stocked and the land deteriorating it was because the Africans had too little land, and no legislation would improve it.

In June, 1958, some Africans in the Sipolilo Reserve of Mashonaland returned their permits saying that they had never applied for them and could not be compelled to take them. They were prosecuted and found guilty. Congress helped them to appeal and the appeal was allowed. The permits were invalidated. At the end of last year Congress urged four Africans to sue Sir Edgar Whitehead, in his capacity as Minister of Native Affairs, because they had been allotted no land. They were hastily given land. Thousands more prepared to sue. This is the real reason why Congress was banned. It was becoming too strong and too successful. It was threatening the basis of the European stronghold.

The government argues that we represent nobody. In September, 1957, Congress had 153 branches and

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RE-THINKING WEST

JAMAICAN OPINION

FEDERATIONS are all the rage. They appear to be the solution to all the marginal problems of the Colonial Office, and by the simple device of attaching weak and deficient economies to more prosperous ones H.M. Government has found an excellent formula for shifting the cost of colonial services to a Federal treasury. This now appears in part as the motive for the formation of the Federation of the West Indies and accounts, in part also, for the steady pressure from London for Federation from the time of the Montego Bay Conference in 1947 up to the signing of the Federation documents in 1958.

At the same time the political ambitions of the West Indians were directed towards independence as a Dominion within the Commonwealth and, except for Jamaica, this seemed very remote except through Federation. The political motivation was in fact so compelling that many of the economic facts were overlooked or misunderstood. It is now for instance abundantly clear that a general belief was created that Federation of itself would generate economic prosperity, that mere size created bargaining power in the commodity markets. It was not adequately realised that regional bargaining for sugar and citrus products, coconut fats and oils was already established and that the Federation was the combining of similar rather than complementary economies. It was this presumed extra wealth that was to provide the Federal income and to enable the Federation to assume the grants-in-aid and other expenses that would be transferred from the U.K. Treasury, together with the costs of Federal services in general. No single West Indian leader was at any time willing to envisage a drop in his island's standard of living to finance Federation.

Resources and Population

The event has belied the hope. It is now quite obvious that the three stronger islands, Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados, are going to have to raise extra taxation and forgo development if funds are to be raised for any ambitious Federal schemes. It is equally clear that the first Federal legislators think they should do so. Their economies are expanding and their National Incomes are rising, and furthermore are rising *per capita*; but they are all haunted by one great fact, that so are their populations and that however wisely they develop their resources, and however much headway they make in the next few years in terms of individual incomes, they are small islands with small resources and may come to the end of their resources and their populations may continue to expand.

Turning from economies to constitutions, we find a Federal constitution which, by placing most of the important subjects on a concurrent list under which Federal legislation always overrides unit or island legislation, places great potential powers in the hands of the Federal Government. This was obviously

drawn up with the next 50 or 100 years in mind and it must have been assumed that no major attempts will be made by the Federation to override the units, since the larger ones who must provide the finances would hardly accept imposed solutions of problems like those presented in Customs Union or Federal taxation. Unfortunately this does not seem to have been fully understood at the Federal level and energetic, well-meaning Federal legislators and civil servants have shown signs of preparing to use their powers and centralise more quickly than the units are prepared to accept.

Half the Federation

All of this is very much intensified by the special position of Jamaica, which is nearly half the Federation in every way. Its population is about 49 per cent. of the whole and its agreed proportion of the Federal finances for the first five years is 43 per cent. The Jamaicans feel that the rapid expansion of the Jamaican economy is due to their efforts and that the fruits should be made available to Federation only at Jamaica's decision and not by over-riding Federal action. That is why they are asking for a ten or 15 year period in which to accommodate the high protection which they now give to a few key industries to a Federal Customs Union. That is why they do not accept the deceptively simple mathematics of the Croft Report. On its publication, Mr. Manley stated, 'It is obvious that the future of the proposals for Customs Union will depend on the nature and character of the changes which are made in the Federal constitution. . . . We will continue to give the fullest study to the Customs Union proposals; we will not take part in any official discussions.' They also feel that customs revenues could provide all the finance necessary for a modest Federal service and they do not accept the need for a Federal income tax for which the Federal authorities are already clamouring.

In all these circumstances to be anti-Federation in Jamaica is all too easy. Any politician can get up and claim to be the protector of the people from high new taxes and Federal interference which might direct new industries away from Jamaica. Sir Alexander Bustamante and the Jamaica Labour Party have chosen that line and compelled the Hon. N. W. Manley, the Chief Minister, to review the situation and in turn to make his own proposals for reform of the Federal constitution. This was due within five years in any case, although legally the review provided for in the Constitution does not give the units any absolute rights of amendment; they all accepted the present five years' plan as an experiment and more in the nature of a compact than a permanent and binding institution. Now the Federal members of Parliament, again in a mood of unwise haste, have called for a constitutional review this year. Preliminary meetings are to be held in May and a full conference in June. It is now quite certain that Jamaica will have important modifications in the present constitution to recommend.

INDIAN FEDERATION

A FEDERAL VIEW

The idea of a West Indies federation is not new, neither is the resistance to it. From the early days of plantations, there have been faint suggestions that it would be better for the various British colonies in the areas to combine into one unit. The fact that the islands were separated by vast distances in the Caribbean Sea was a natural barrier to the realisation of any such ideal. Each island was individually linked with Britain or North America, but there was hardly any link between themselves at a time when, in any case, the means of transport were very limited. Thus the idea of federation could hardly be regarded as a new device by the Colonial Office for solving 'marginal problems.'

West Indians have, since the war, got to know each other much better. They have started to look at one another and have seen common problems. Despite their isolation in past centuries from each other they have noticed a similar pattern of development modified only by local history and geography. The West Indies have also been influenced by the 20th century desire of all peoples to manage their own affairs and to achieve that great self respect which goes with political independence. It is not surprising that an attempt to achieve this independence by federation should meet with great difficulties arising out of inter-island jealousy on the part of islands which have developed in relative isolation from each other, but as the Prime Minister of The West Indies has pointed out, there has been less wrangling between the units of The West Indies Federation than there has been in the early stages of all the known successful federations.

Benefit to Trade

It has not yet been successfully proved that the combination of the territories will not allow them to achieve a greater bargaining power for their products in the world market and the psychological effect of having to deal with The West Indies as opposed to dealing with Jamaica, St. Lucia and Montserrat separately cannot be detrimental. This has already been shown in the willingness of the Canadian Government to trade with the Federation rather than with any of the unit territories.

There is no law of economics which incontrovertibly states that higher taxation would inhibit development nor is it a fact that the contribution of revenue to the Federation will inhibit development in Trinidad and Jamaica. It has yet to be worked out in detail what benefits can be derived by Jamaican industries from having a larger market within the Federation and we cannot state at this stage quite definitely that the apparent loss in revenue from joining a customs union may on final analysis prove to be more than compensated by revenue accruing from other benefits.

There is a slight danger of malthusian economics in the statement that 'they are small islands with small resources and may come to the end of their resources' with the population continuing to expand. Not many people realise that the West Indies must be regarded as part of the unexplored regions in the world. Though populated and colonised for 300 years, accurate assessments of mineral and agricultural resources have never been carried out. This is evidenced by the paucity of accurate geology maps or detailed soil surveys. Not even the fish potential of the Caribbean Sea itself seems to be clearly known. As a region attracting visitors, it has only just begun to be noticed. The relationship with the Latin American Republics has always been coloured by the fact that the West Indies have never been considered as part of the Americas but merely as anomalous colonies in the area. An independent West Indies should be able to reap the benefits of the Pan-American Association as well as develop closer links with Canada based on the tie of membership within the Commonwealth. A series of ineffective governments, scattered on small islands struggling on their own, could hardly be expected to exploit these situations as the Federal Government can.

There has been a tendency in The West Indies to disparage the efforts of the Federation to develop diplomatic representation overseas. The benefits of this has never been easily explicable to the layman, but in the past The West Indies have had to depend far too much on marginal benefits negotiated by U.K. diplomatic missions who most naturally must consider the interest of the U.K. as paramount. Jamaica could undoubtedly stand on her own without federation, and the statement by the Colonial Secretary at the time of the Conference which finally decided upon federation, could be regarded as subtle bullying. But again it has yet to be shown that Jamaica has lost more than she can gain by being in the Federation. We have just mentioned one minor aspect, namely, diplomatic representation which though essential, is costly and it would be ridiculous for Jamaica to have to duplicate the services set up by a federation of the other islands.

Lastly, it is up to Jamaicans and the various other peoples of the islands to see that obscurantism from the smaller islands does not in any way inhibit progress. Jamaicans at first were rather lukewarm to the Federation and tended to let matters slip into the hands of representatives of the smaller islands. Having actually entered the federation they now realise that the federation affects them. Naturally, reaction to some of the unpopular actions in recent months has been to suggest that the federation be avoided rather than reformed or helped or advised. When Jamaica realises that she is on the inside rather than on the outside looking in, the Jamaicans will see that they can be a source of inspiration and can provide leadership and guidance for the much needed development of some of the smaller islands, and indeed the area as a whole.

DEMOCRACY - A NEW MODEL ?

By A CORRESPONDENT

IT is desirable, though tedious, that in colonial politics we should constantly be driven back to first principles. At present we seem to be living through a period comparable to that of 15 years ago, when a new Labour Government were seeking to carry out a policy of orderly advance to self-government in the midst of post-war shortages and confusion. Practically everywhere the machinery of government—political and administrative—was sadly out of date. The first injections of reform were in some cases almost anachronistic before they were administered, and within five years orderly advance had given way to a breakneck speed to keep pace with nationalist demands.

The pace was maintained against much criticism. A crisis had only to occur in a colony, a speaker informed a delighted London audience, for one of the Fabian 'experts' to drop her knitting and engender a constitution. Moreover, the whole operation was a wasted effort to transplant to backward territories a system of government evolved over many centuries in Britain.

And now, after a decade of independence in Ceylon, Mr. Bandaranaike tells us that it is wrong to assume that the British system 'is either the best or the most likely to succeed in the case of other countries where circumstances are different.' The critics of ten years ago have hailed this pronouncement and also point knowingly at Pakistan, Singapore, the Sudan and Ghana. They do not, on the other hand, pay much attention to Nigeria, the West Indies, Malaya or India, where 'the system' works more successfully.

A Question of Attitudes

Surely the root of the matter is not in the letter of the constitution (for 'the system' is infinitely flexible) but in the handling. Mr. Bandaranaike explained that cabinet government in Ceylon and some other Commonwealth countries is dictatorship: dictatorship of the party which has won the elections, dictatorship of the Cabinet over the party and dictatorship of a small inner Cabinet over the Cabinet itself. If this is so, the attitudes of mind which produce this situation would in the long run wreck any system, British or otherwise. When Mr. Bandaranaike finds it necessary to warn members of his Government against directly or indirectly attacking one another in public, one wonders whether Ceylon has been trying to work any system at all.

Yet it is true that a British cabinet is held in check not only by a vague 'public opinion' but also by the innumerable vested interests in all departments of life which together go to make up a functioning political society. If the variety is there without the homogeneity, as may prove to be the case in Singapore, or an attempt is made to stamp out the variety in the name of unity, as may prove to be the case in Ghana, of course parliamentary government cannot

'work,' but nor can any other system, for refusal to seek agreement in either situation will ultimately lead to anarchy or rebellion.

The Labour Party is now virtually committed to democracy as an essential condition of independence, and indeed there is hardly a colonial nationalist who thinks it respectable or practicable to ask for anything else. But it is true that there is some unwillingness to face the implications of this demand. 'One man, one vote' is not a democratic demand, in the British sense, if made by a party recruited solely from a majority race. 'Equal rights for all civilised men' is not a slogan of equality if the 'civilised' are a minority perpetuating their own standards. No parliamentary system can function democratically with corruption or intimidation. There is no need to specify cases.

If the Asian countries have had difficulties, Africa is likely to have more. It is valuable, therefore, to have available studies on West Africa, where the problem is not complicated by the presence of settled 'European' and 'Asian' communities. The Hansard Society published last year, under the title 'What are the problems of Parliamentary Government in West Africa?' a report of its Oxford Conference held in September, 1957¹. Here are set out papers and comments which focus attention on the two problems emphasised by Sir Ivor Jennings from his experience in Asia, that of 'securing a constitution which satisfies the competing elements in a heterogeneous society' and 'that of getting an organisation in depth which can function efficiently under a system of responsible government'.

All the papers are interesting and useful as records of fact as well as opinion. There are one or two slips: e.g. constitutional consultations began in Nigeria in 1949, not in 1950 as stated by Mr. Arikpo, while Mr. Austin, in a very tendentious sentence on page 11, conveys the impression that the transition from native administration to local government in the Gold Coast was originated by the Convention People's Party Government in 1951, although officials were actually working on the projected ordinance before ever that Government was formed. There are also too many errors in proof reading for a book of this standing. But the book should be bought and read. Chief Awolowo on the Second Chamber, Sir Frederick Metcalfe on Parliamentary Procedure in the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives, Mr. Canham on Parliament and the Civil Service, and Mr. Wiseman on the Development of the Cabinet will stand the test of time.

Mr. Hodgkin, however, falls below his usual high standard. In covering a very wide field of political parties and trying to preserve the kind of academic detachment which allows him to refer to the Nigerian crisis of 1953 as the defeat of parliamentary leaders

¹ Hansard Society, 15s.

by a party caucus 'in certain, perhaps rather special circumstances,' he does not lay bare the main danger to parliamentary institutions which subsequent events have made plain for all to see. But Mr. Austin reveals it in his reference to Ghana in 1950 and 1954-6, 'the exasperation which leads to violence' when a party found itself unrepresented in the Assembly, or the comment of Mr. Price that in most Ghanaian languages 'opposition' can only be translated as 'enemy'. It is at this point that traditional attitudes derived from a tribal system with some democratic characteristics fail to measure up to the needs of a parliamentary system.

Yet, as Mr. Bandaranaike has shown, it is the attitudes as much as the system that require reconsideration, unless, of course, these emerging countries are going to be content with some form of despotism, which seems unlikely. The last word was actually spoken by Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas, M.P., in his opening speech to the Oxford Conference: 'This building of parliamentary institutions is not merely a task for politicians, dons and administrators. It is a task for all citizens. When Bright spoke of the "Mother of Parliaments" he referred to England, not to Westminster.'

Correspondence

To the Editor of VENTURE

MAURITIUS GOES AHEAD

Sir,—In your note on Mauritius (May, p.5) you rightly draw attention to the undemocratic nature of the Governor's right under the present constitution to make up to twelve nominations to the Legislative Council without being compelled to consult anyone.

One of his recent nominations has, in fact, been the subject of much resentment and strong criticism in Mauritius; it has been, too, the subject of a Parliamentary question over here. I refer to the nomination (the re-nomination, actually, for a third term) of Mr. Jean Ah-Chuen, theoretically to represent the Sino-Mauritian community since that community is not represented in Council by an elected Member.

Mr. Ah-Chuen was nominated in 1948 and again in 1953, but has proved an unsatisfactory spokesman for the Sino-Mauritian community. Indeed, he can hardly be said to have been a spokesman at all, for the Mauritius Hansard shows that he hardly ever spoke. On vital matters such as constitutional change, when one would have expected that he would have spoken on his community's reaction to various proposals which were being canvassed (since his community is one of the minorities) the voice of the Sino-Mauritian spokesman was not heard!

At the recent general election, Mr. Ah-Chuen stood for election in the constituency of Port Louis Maritime, where there were some 650 registered Chinese electors. He was opposed by, among others, a Moslem Action Committee candidate (with the support of the Labour Party) and another Sino-Mauritian, Mr. Ng Wong Hing. The boundary commissioners who had last year delineated the 40 constituencies in Mauritius had said of the Sino-Mauritian community that it could not hope to get

elected representation in Council unless it successfully canvassed for support among other racial groups. In the event, in Port Louis Maritime, Mr. Ah-Chuen polled 479 votes against Mr. Ng Wong Hing's 457. (The successful M.A.C. candidate received 858.

So after ten years as a nominated M.L.C., Mr. Ah-Chuen was decisively rejected; he and his Chinese opponent receiving virtually the same number of votes. Mr. Ah-Chuen's supporters could not, it was clear successfully canvass enough support to get him elected. It would seem inequitable, therefore, that he should be nominated as the Sino-Mauritians' representative once again. Mr. Ng Wong Hing has as good a claim, under the 'good loser' principle which has been favoured, to be the Sino-Mauritian nominee.

His claim is better than Mr. Ah-Chuen's, indeed, in view of the anathema which many Sino-Mauritians have for Mr. Ah-Chuen's open support for the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. All this helps to add to the uneasiness which many responsible Sino-Mauritians feel at Mr. Mr. Ah-Chuen's re-nomination. Public opinion cannot compel the Governor to 'de-nominate' Mr. Ah-Chuen; but it could perhaps persuade Mr. Ah-Chuen, in the best interests of his community, to resign. Perhaps the Commonwealth Bureau can help?

PETER IBBOTSON,

London Representative, *Mauritius Times*.

To the Editor of VENTURE

GOOD SENSE IN TANGANYIKA

Sir,—There is one point which was not mentioned in last month's Venture Comment and which is of importance to us out here. The Dar-es-Salaam European seat is, I am sure, a key one. In the elections I won this seat even without the African (TANU) vote, for my majority was larger by some hundreds than the total Africans on the roll. So, although some of my European 'friends' call me a White Kaffir, they cannot say I got in on the African vote.

Dar-es-Salaam.

D. F. HEATH, M.L.C.

To the Editor of VENTURE

Sir,—Economic policy was not a part of TANU's election demands. This is, of course, understandable as economic policy can only be profitably discussed once the centre of gravity has begun to move from the Colonial Office to the people of Tanganyika.

Certain minimum 'inside information' is necessary before a basis can be laid for a new economic policy. At present various *ad hoc* views are being held by the elected members on various matters but a coherent over-all economic policy can only be based on a development plan.

One thing is clear to me. TANU will increasingly draw its ideas of economic policy from the Tanganyika Elected Members Organisation. This is as it should be. As long as we all are working on the same frequency, as it were, the outcome of such a joint policy can only be in the best interests of Tanganyika.

AMIR H. JAMAL, M.L.C.

Dar-es-Salaam.

Parliament and the Colonies

Smaller Colonial Territories. Mr. Norman Pannell proposed the motion that as it was the declared general policy of the government to develop in its colonial territories the greatest practicable measure of self government, it was desirable for the Government to evolve a positive policy for those smaller territories where difficulties might arise in regard to the achievement of complete independence within the Commonwealth. Mr. Julian Amery (Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) said that the Government welcomed the motion and accepted its terms in principle, but the problems were extremely difficult and intractable. At any given moment the different problems whether wealth, cultural standards or lack of political institutions, constituted an obstacle to the achievement of full sovereignty. Those obstacles were not necessarily permanent. Circumstances changed.

New resources could be discovered in a small territory. The whole order of the world might well change over the next few generations so as to make it safer for small communities to be on their own than it was at present. Obstacles could be overcome on some occasions by union between the territory concerned and neighbouring countries. Others could be removed by the efforts of the colony and of the Government, but in many cases it was not yet possible to set out a time table or a plan. One could not produce a kind of blueprint to be applied to all the smaller territories. For smaller and poorer territories Colonial Development and Welfare assistance was likely to remain the most important single source of finance for capital expenditure and development. There were also certain territories which, as far as could be foreseen, would remain unable to pay their way on current account even with the barest minimum level of services. Recurrent assistance would continue to be needed for such territories. On the political side, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association already made an enormous contribution by the visits it sponsored and by its conferences. There might possibly be scope for enlarging these conferences or for having special conferences to deal with certain areas. They would be on the right lines if they thought in terms of giving a distinct identity and a special place in the Commonwealth to territories which had reached the stage of maximum internal self-government. He stressed 'internal self-government' for this could be conferred while the U.K. still retained appropriate responsibilities for defence and external affairs and perhaps even in certain cases for the safeguarding of minorities. (April 17.)

Constitutional Developments in Kenya. In the course of an adjournment debate, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the aim of the Government in Kenya as in other dependent territories was to build a nation based on Parliamentary institutions and enjoying responsible self-government in conditions which

secured for its people a fair standard of living and freedom of oppression from any quarter. He saw no reason why the conditions necessary for the people of Kenya to make a success of responsible self-government should not one day be fulfilled. What were the conditions in which the U.K. Government would eventually be able to hand over authority with a good conscience? First, there must be in the territory as a whole a sufficient understanding of parliamentary institutions and sufficient sense of responsibility in public affairs, to hold out a reasonable prospect that parliamentary institutions representative of the people, would produce responsible government and not chaos or dictatorship. Secondly, there must have been established a sufficient measure of understanding and co-operation between the various communities to ensure mutual tolerance and acceptance by all of the right of each to remain in Kenya and continue to play a part in the public as well as the economic life of the country. Thirdly, there must be a reasonable prospect that any government to which the U.K. surrendered her responsibilities would be able to ensure a fair standard of living in an expanding economy. Fourthly, a competent and experienced Civil Service was an essential part of political institutions. A Kenya government composed of local people would not succeed unless supported by a well-trained Civil Service which ultimately would be drawn also from local people. The U.K. government could help by pressing on with the critically important task of building up institutions of local and central government which would provide a good training ground for responsible government and would be well devised to secure within a broad framework of democratic government the proper rights and interests of all the different communities. (April 23.)

Collective Fines in Nyasaland. In reply to Miss Herbison, Mr. Amery said that the average basic earnings of workers in the Mlange District of Nyasaland for the 26-day employment ticket amounted to £2 14s. 2d. Miss Herbison asked whether he was aware that the individual share of the collective fine was almost a month's wages. Mr. Amery replied that the Governor had in many cases reduced the fine so that it did not even cover the cost of the damage done because he had taken account of the conditions of the people in the area.

Africans Shot in Nyasaland. Miss Herbison asked what weapons had been used when 20 Africans were killed at Nkata Bay and what previous action had been taken to disperse the people. Mr. Amery replied that a Sten gun and rifles had been used. Mr. G. M. Thomson asked if the Under-Secretary of State denied that the crowd had been unarmed and why tear gas was not used to disperse them. Mr. Amery replied that he did not know if tear gas was available at that point. He was not clear that the crowd was unarmed in the strict sense of the word. (May 5.)

Guide to Books . . .

European Politics in Southern Rhodesia

By Colin Leys. (Oxford University Press, 42s.) Europeans in Southern Rhodesia are apt to be offended if anyone points out that their form of government is not democratic. They argue that their parliamentary institutions are based on the British system and that the franchise is limited only to 'preserve civilised standards and maintain the British way of life.' Mr. Colin Leys in this analysis of European politics in Southern Rhodesia shows just what a mockery these institutions are and how hollow the intentions of those who work them.

Much of the material in this book could be used in the current argument about the future of the Federation but, though the last sentence suggests that the author may have this at the back of his mind, this is not a polemic but an academic study carried out with patience and scrupulous fairness. Mr. Leys amasses his facts and analyses them shrewdly. In a subject which invites passion he remains balanced and detached.

The book is largely concerned with the detail of election statistics and with nice shades of political thought, but these details are in themselves illuminating and build up an exact picture of this unique community, 200,000 strong, torn between a desire to 'go it alone' and the necessity of convincing the world of its good intentions. These paradoxical aims have, as Mr. Leys points out, produced a particular Rhodesian phraseology so that people who throw up their hands at the idea of baaskap can happily say that 'European leadership and guidance in the federation must be maintained for an indefinite time in the foreseeable future.'

In this small world contact is so close that a candidate will reckon to do much of his canvassing by letter and personal visits; business and government interests are inextricably mixed and the parties so united on the race question (Mr. Todd deviated a little and was removed) that this rarely becomes an election or even a political issue. What makes democracy so hollow is that an opposition is artificially created from within the European community while the Africans, who form the real opposition, are excluded from political life. 'It is generally assumed,' says Mr. Leys, 'that Southern Rhodesia has a two party system which does not work. It is more illuminating to say that she has a one party system which does.'

Mr. Leys is at his best when analysing the report of the Tredgold Commission, upon which the present franchise in Southern Rhodesia (and the Federal franchise) is based. The report stated that universal franchise was the ideal but that it could only function under certain conditions and these were missing in Southern Rhodesia. The writers assumed that the existing Southern Rhodesian political system was a form of popular government from which Africans were excluded because they lacked the skill to vote. Their problem was to include some Africans while ensuring that the present system would not be upset and that 'racial' issues would not be allowed to

cloud the 'real' issues. The franchise they produced contains infinite checks and safeguards and admits only a small percentage of the African community, but Mr. Leys concludes that the changes which have been made 'represent the furthest limits to which the European electorate could be induced to go and are intended to be permanent.'

One point Mr. Leys makes sharply is that the acceptance of the idea of partnership did make a significant change in Rhodesian thinking. Before that native policy had been the responsibility of the Native Affairs Department just as road policy had been the responsibility of the Roads Department. With federation the idea of general principles to govern development throughout the country was gingerly accepted. The lack of any real definition of partnership, however, prevented this change in theory bringing any change in practice.

Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs remain an academic problem since she has had responsible government since 1923. This book does however give ample reason why this myopic minority should not be given any more control in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Catherine Hoskyns

Down Second Avenue

By Ezekiel Mphahlele. (Faber and Faber, 18s.)

Ezekiel Mphahlele spent 37 years fighting his way up from a shack in a Pretoria location which housed eleven of his family—that is, after his drunkard father had lurched out of his life. Eighteen months ago, he finally got a passport and flew away to teach in a Nigerian school. But Lagos (or now Ibadan) is not his Utopia; he is still too wound up with all his South African years to fall into a West African tempo. I remember his lunch-hour visits into the Lagos office of 'Drum' magazine, where he seemed happiest to be with other expatriates.

The power of this autobiography lies in the tautness still in him, despite his release from the years of oppression. He complains 'what a crushing cliché the South African situation can be for literary material,' yet he gets the strength of his book from it.

The first part, which he wrote before leaving South Africa, contains some of the most vivid descriptions yet produced of location life—at any rate, of childhood in a location, and the striving upwards. The devastating sketches of the white people (including Ma-Bottles, the alcoholic) whose washing he collected for his washerwoman aunt; the way he learnt to read, being paid by other children to shout out the subtitles of the silent movies; how he first came to hate whites, paradoxically by finding harmony with some of the white teachers at St. Peter's, Sophiatown; and how his womenfolk sacrificed themselves to give him every slender chance in life.

The three university degrees Mr. Mphahlele won were little use to him when he lost his teacher's job

after speaking out against the Bantu Education Act; so for two and a half years he worked on *Drum* as literary editor but, as an intellectual, he rebelled against its lowbrow formula—'most of the time I felt like a bull without a china shop.' The 'interminable wrangling' between the African National Congress and the All-African Convention depressed him further. Seeing no way to help his people (and so justify himself) in his own country, he was 'seized by a desire to leave South Africa for more sky to soar.' And so to Nigeria where he could replenish his 'moral and mental resources.'

This second half then is full of the self-examination of motives by an exile, while the first half holds the very different interest of pictorial description. It is a sombre book and lacks the satirical humour of his friend Sylvester Stein's *Second Class Taxi*. He still has much that he feels he can do for his countrymen, as he showed during the Accra Conference; but as a writer, he longs to soar into quite other skies—if his bitterness, remaining from 37 years in the battened-down world symbolised by his grandmother's Second Avenue, can let him. Let us hope it can, for he is a very gifted writer.

Clyde Sanger

Nyasaland Speaks. By Kanyama Chiume. (Union of Democratic Control and the Movement for Colonial Freedom, 374 Grays Inn Road, W.C.1. 6d.).

Kanyama Chiume, the publicity secretary of the Nyasaland African National Congress, escaped arrest and is now in England. He is one of the four Africans accused in the government white paper of plotting to massacre Europeans, Asians and moderate Africans.

This pamphlet is his answer. Would any African leader, he asks, without arms and without trained men, plan a campaign of violence which would end not in the annihilation of the enemy but in massacre of his own people?

He goes on to give a balanced and reasoned account of Nyasaland's association with Britain and of the unwavering opposition of Congress, Chiefs and people to the imposition of Federation. 'How can the British do this to us?' is his real theme.

C. H.

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ADVANCE NOTICE Fabian Colonial Essays

Fabian Colonial Essays is published this month. Eleven leading socialists, who are also experts in colonial and commonwealth affairs sum up socialist colonial policy, assess the past and plan for the future. This volume of essays asks the question 'Is a socialist commonwealth possible and if so how can it be achieved?'

Marjorie Nicholson, for five years secretary of the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, puts the problem in her essay 'Political Objectives and Developments':

'The United Kingdom can never again be the leading military and economic power in the world. In so far as our cultural influence is dependent on our wealth and strength, that has also been undermined. In this situation as we hand over political power, we can either retreat into a little cultural backwater of our own, or we can reflect that our imperialist phase has brought us into living contact with all the great civilisations of the world and ask ourselves whether or not, in a different relationship, we wish to retain this contact.'

Thomas Balogh, a key member of the Financial and Economic Sub-Committee of the Labour Party, argues for a bold and imaginative economic plan for the Commonwealth. He writes:

'The two most important directions of advance in helping the colonies and the Commonwealth are the creation of some security in the field of primary production through bulk-purchase agreements (which would undoubtedly entail subsidisation) on the one hand, and, on the other, the steady advancement (again through subsidies) of the transformation of the present chaotic and economically detrimental land-tenure systems into co-operative production closely guided and supervised.' These and other suggestions he elaborates in his essay 'Britain and the Dependent Commonwealth.'

Other essays in the volume include: the Right Hon. Arthur Creech Jones, M.P., on 'The Labour Party and Colonial Policy 1945-1951,' Lionel Elvin on 'Social Development,' Dr. Rita Hinden on 'Socialism and the Colonial World,' and Mrs. Eirene White, M.P., on 'What Hope for a Socialist Commonwealth?'

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